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Abstract 
In 2013, “No 18 File” from Organization Department of the CPC gave rise to a 
resign tide of official independent director. Meanwhile, Japanese Congress pass a 
company law amendment in 2014. It stipulated explicitly that listed company must 
employ more than two independent directors. And it did limit the government officer 
on take up the post of independent directors. Because of that, there was a employment 
tide of official independent director in Japan. The regulatory of China and Japan took 
different attitude to official independent director in the same time. People started to 
discuss the function of official independent director in corporation governance. As a 
special sample, the existence and function of official independent director arouse 
market and academic interests. 
In the theoretical part, this article defines the concept of independent director and 
political connection. And we also introduce the development of independent director 
system. Then we discuss principal-agent theory and Informal institution theory. The 
core question is what role independent directors play. So we put emphasis on Chinese 
and foreign scholars research on functions of independent directors. In addition, as the 
price of independent director’s function, we discuss some research on bonus. 
Because that, people found that there were so many official independent directors 
in public company. Based on the empirical research of 6652 a-share listed companies, 
our article analyze the application of the independent director system in listed 
companies from three dimensions – institutional environment, function and pricing. 
The results prove that companies located in the areas of poorer legal environment tend 
to employ official independent director. The relationship between earning 
management and employing official independent director is not very significant. This 
shows that official independent director do not play the role of watchdog. Meanwhile, 
governmental subsidy in companies which employ official independent director is 
more than others, which indicates that official independent director executes 
consulting function significantly. Finally, the bonus which company gives official 
independent director is more than that company gives non-official independent 
director.  
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